




Pandemic Flu Preparedness:  
LESSONS FROM THE FRONTLINES
The recent H1N1 (swine) flu outbreak demonstrated how rapidly a newstrain of flu can emerge and spread around the world.  As of June 1, 2009,
the H1N1 virus was reported in 62 nations, with nearly 17,500 confirmed cases
and more than 100 deaths.  The sudden outbreak of this novel flu virus has
tested the world’s public health preparedness.  H1N1 provided a real-world test
that showed the strengths and vulnerabilities in the abilities of the United States
and the rest of the world to respond to a major infectious disease outbreak.  
This report examines early lessons learned
from the response and ongoing concerns
about overall U.S. preparedness for potential
pandemic flu outbreak.  The first section re-
views 10 key lessons based on the initial re-
sponse to the H1N1 outbreak; and the second
section discusses 10 underlying concerns and
provides recommendations for addressing se-
rious continued vulnerabilities in the nation’s
preparedness in the event that H1N1 returns
in the fall, either in its current form or as a
more virulent strain, or if a different strain of
influenza, like the H5N1 (bird) flu, emerges.
Overall, the H1N1 outbreak has shown that the
investment the country has made in preparing
for a potential pandemic flu has significantly im-
proved U.S. capabilities for a large scale infec-
tious disease outbreak, but it has also revealed
how quickly the nation’s core public health ca-
pacity would be overwhelmed if the outbreak
were more widespread and more severe.  
2SUMMARY OF TEN EARLY LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
THE 2009 H1N1 OUTBREAK
1. Investments in pandemic planning and stockpiling antiviral medications paid off;
2. Public health departments did not have enough resources to carry out plans;
3. Response plans must be adaptable and science-driven;
4. Providing clear, straightforward information to the public was essential for allaying fears
and building trust;
5. School closings have major ramifications for students, parents, and employers;
6. Sick leave and policies for limiting mass gatherings were also problematic;
7. Even with a mild outbreak, the health care delivery system was overwhelmed;  
8. Communication between the public health system and health providers was not well coordinated;
9. WHO pandemic alert phases caused confusion; and 
10.  International coordination was more complicated than expected.
SUMMARY OF TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING CORE 
VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. PANDEMIC FLU PREPAREDNESS
In addition to the lessons learned from H1N1, there are a number of systemic gaps in the nation’s ability
to respond to a pandemic flu outbreak.  To further strengthen U.S. preparedness, the following core
areas must be addressed:
Strategic National Stockpile and Vaccine Development Recommendations:
1. Maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile -- making sure enough antiviral medications, vac-
cinations, and equipment are available to protect Americans, which includes replenishing the stock-
pile when medications and supplies are used;
2. Vaccine development and production -- enhancing the biomedical research and development
abilities of the United States to rapidly develop and produce a vaccine; and
3. Vaccinating all Americans -- ensuring that all Americans would be able to be inoculated in a short pe-
riod of time.
Adaptable, Science-Based Planning and Coordination Recommendations:
4. Planning and coordination -- improving coordination among federal, state, and local govern-
ments and the private sector preparedness and planning activities on an ongoing basis, including
taking into account how the nature of flu threats change over time;
5. School closings, sick leave, and community mitigation strategies -- improving strategies to
limit the spread of disease ensuring all working Americans have sick leave benefits and that com-
munities are prepared to limit public gatherings and close schools as necessary; and
6. Global coordination -- building trust, technologies, and policies internationally to encourage sci-
ence-based, consistent decision making across borders during an outbreak.
Core Public Health Infrastructure Improvement Recommendations:
7. Resources -- providing enough funding for the on-the-ground response, which is currently under-
funded and overextended; and
8. Workforce -- stopping layoffs at state and local health departments and recruiting the next genera-
tion of public health professionals.
Surge Capacity and Care Recommendations:
9. Surge capacity -- improving the ability for health providers to manage a massive influx of patients; and
10. Caring for the uninsured and underinsured -- ensuring that all Americans will receive care
during an emergency, which limits the spread of the contagious disease to others, and making
sure hospitals and health care providers are compensated for providing care.
TEN EARLY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2009
H1N1 OUTBREAK
1. Investments in pandemic planning and stock-
piling antiviral medications paid off.  Federal,
state, and local efforts to develop and exercise
pandemic response plans over the last several
years enabled public health officials to react to
the outbreak effectively and keep the public in-
formed.  Investments in antiviral stockpiles and
enhanced vaccine manufacturing capacity also
proved to be prudent. 
2. Public health departments did not have enough
resources to carry out plans. Federal, state, and
local health departments are stretched too thin
to adequately respond to emergencies after
decades of underfunding the public health in-
frastructure.  Capacity to track, investigate, and
contain cases of H1N1 has been hampered due
to lack of resources. For instance, CDC and
state laboratory testing was days to more than a
week behind the on-the-ground reality.  Also,
the country must make a sustained commit-
ment to pandemic preparedness by providing
consistent federal funding for stockpiling med-
icines and medical supplies, training, and plan-
ning activities.  However, there have been no
state and local pandemic preparedness funds
appropriated since fiscal year (FY) 2006.  If the
current outbreak had been more severe, state
and local health departments likely would have
been even more overwhelmed. 
3. Response plans must be adaptable and science-
driven.  For years, pandemic flu planning fo-
cused on the potential threat of the H5N1
(bird) flu that has been circulating in Asia for
the past 10 years.  In addition, much of the
planning anticipated that there would be a six-
week lead time between the time a novel flu
strain was detected before it reached the
United States.  H1N1 showed that a new flu
strain can emerge quickly or go undetected for
a period of time and rapidly spread throughout
the world.  As the epidemic unfolded, new
knowledge required government officials to re-
assess guidance offered to the public and the
medical community.  For example, as it became
clearer that H1N1 was circulating widely in
communities and largely causing mild cases,
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) officials lifted their recommen-
dations on school closures to match the
changing circumstances.  Different communi-
ties faced different situations, such as the extent
of the spread of the virus into a community,
which resulted in the need for different policies
in different places.
4. Providing clear, straightforward information to
the public was essential for allaying fears and
building trust.  Informing the public about what
is known about an outbreak, acknowledging
that certain information is not yet known, and
updating facts as they become available is para-
mount to help contain the spread of disease and
also give people the facts they need to be pre-
pared, not scared.  During the outbreak, the
President and other leaders around the coun-
try served as clear spokespeople, conveying con-
sistent, accurate information about good hand
hygiene, cough/sneeze etiquette, and the need
for people to stay home if sick.  Effective lead-
ership and communication helped dispel ru-
mors and myths -- from allaying concerns about
the safety of imported Mexican foodstuffs to re-
versing the unfair characterization of Spanish-
speaking people as carriers of the contagion.
Public health officials also encountered the
need to explain to members of the public that
different policies are not necessarily inconsis-
tent, but tailored to local realities.
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5. School closings have major ramifications for
students, parents, and employers.  In areas
where schools were closed due to H1N1, par-
ents had to scramble to find alternative child
care arrangements, which were complicated
by the guidance that children home from
school should stay separated.  Many parents
had to face taking sick leave from work to stay
home to care for their children even if they
were not ill, or taking days off without pay if
they did not have sick leave.  Many families
also rely on the school meal programs and be-
fore and after school care, which were also
not available when schools were closed.  In
the event that another outbreak occurs or the
H1N1 returns in the fall and schools may have
to close in more places and for longer dura-
tions, these complications would become an
even bigger concern.  This is especially prob-
lematic for jurisdictions that require a mini-
mum number of days attended to graduate.
6. Sick leave and policies for limiting mass gather-
ings were also problematic.  There were nu-
merous media reports of people with
influenza-like illness continuing to go to work
because they had no sick leave and feared los-
ing their jobs, and some parents sent sick chil-
dren to school because they could not stay
home to care for them.  In addition, while they
were not instituted during the outbreak, it be-
came clear to officials how difficult it would be
to carry out plans to limit mass gatherings or
cancel major events if that became necessary.  In
areas of Mexico, there were serious economic
ramifications when officials recommended peo-
ple avoid shopping and public events.
7. Even with a mild outbreak, the health care de-
livery system was overwhelmed.  Even this rel-
atively mild outbreak proved to be a low-level
“stress test” on the health system.  It revealed
significant problems and lack of preparedness
particularly for out-patient settings where there
was inadequate personal protective equipment
and a limited understanding of infection con-
trol measures.  At many hospitals, the “worried
well” overwhelmed emergency departments.2
Also, concerns about health care costs were a
deterrent for many in seeking early medical at-
tention, especially among the uninsured and
underinsured. A further deterrent to seeking
prompt medical care was fear among undocu-
mented immigrants that making contact with
health authorities could result in deportation.
8. Communication between the public health sys-
tem and health providers was not well coordi-
nated.  During the outbreak, many private
medical practitioners reported that they did
not receive CDC guidance documents in a
timely fashion.  Other practitioners noted that
CDC guidance lacked clinically relevant infor-
mation and was difficult to translate into prac-
tical instructions.  
9. WHO pandemic alert phases caused confusion.
The WHO pandemic alert phase system was not
well matched with the realities of the H1N1 out-
break, since most of the planning was built
around concerns of a much more severe pan-
demic outbreak and focused on the geographic
spread and transmission patterns, but not the
severity of the disease.  WHO is currently con-
sidering how to revise its pandemic alert phases
to address both the geographic spread as well as
the severity of the virus. 
10.  International coordination was more com-
plicated than expected.  Despite advice from
the WHO, some countries chose to close
their borders to Mexican citizens or banned
pork products from the United States and
Mexico.  These measures were not based on
either science or reasonable public health
practices and caused unnecessary economic
losses.  Once a flu virus is circulating
throughout the population, containment
strategies, like travel restrictions, generally
will not work, given that it is possible to in-
fect others before a person develops flu-like
symptoms. Also, the effectiveness of some
mitigation strategies implemented (face
masks in Mexico) were overstated.
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COMMUNICATION WAS KEY, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR US TO BE CAREFUL TO SAY
WHAT WE DID NOT KNOW, FORESHADOWING POSSIBLE CHANGES IN POLICY, AND BEING CLEAR
AT THE OUTSET THAT WHAT WE LEARNED ABOUT BOTH SEVERITY AND TRANSMISSIBILITY
WOULD DETERMINE OUR RESPONSE.     1
DAVID FLEMING, MD, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SEATTLE & KING COUNTY WASHINGTON
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TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING CORE
VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. PANDEMIC FLU PREPAREDNESS
A.  STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND VACCINE DEVELOPMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  MAINTAINING THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE:  Purchasing antiviral medications,
vaccines, and equipment for the stockpile must be updated and restocked on an ongoing basis.  
The investment in pandemic flu preparedness helped the country respond to thefirst round of the H1N1 outbreak much more effectively than could have been
achieved a few years ago.  However, the limits of the response underscored ongoing
gaps in the nation’s core capabilities and the need to build up and modernize the pub-
lic health infrastructure, which has been underfunded and under resourced for
decades.  Unless these gaps are addressed, our ability to respond to emergencies will re-
main inadequate.
The fact that the country had stockpiled a supply
of antiviral medications made it possible to rap-
idly deploy medicine to treat flu patients around
the country, though ultimately large supplies
were not needed.  The outbreak showed the lim-
its of the current stockpile, which is currently
based on a system that relies on states to pur-
chase a portion of the medications, and does not
have mechanisms in place for constantly replen-
ishing and updating the supplies.
In addition, the importance of the investment
the country has made in biomedical research,
and in particular vaccine development and pro-
duction, is underscored as scientists race against
the clock to develop an H1N1 vaccine for the fall
of 2009 while continuing to develop vaccines for
other flu viruses.  
The possible need to find ways to swiftly vacci-
nate the entire U.S. population, however, also
shows that the country does not yet have an ad-
equate system in place to rapidly vaccinate all
Americans. Nor is there a registry in place to
track the two vaccinations per person.
The following recommendations relate to en-
suring systems and supplies to mass treat and
vaccinate the public during a flu outbreak:
 Purchasing antiviral medications, vaccines, and
equipment for the stockpile should be a federal
responsibility.  
Combined, the federal and state antiviral pur-
chases are intended to treat 25 percent of the
U.S. population, or 75 million people.  Prior
to the H1N1 outbreak, the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
completed the purchase of 50 million treat-
ment courses of antiviral drugs for the federal
portion of the antiviral stockpile goal. The
federal government should replenish its share
of the antiviral stockpile deployed to states
and localities intended for treatment during
the current H1N1 outbreak and purchase ad-
ditional courses for prophylaxis.  
HHS needs to develop a workable plan for both
the use and stockpiling of antivirals. Currently,
states are expected to purchase a portion of the
antiviral medications that would be needed to
protect citizens in their states through a pro-
gram that included 25 percent subsidy from the
federal government.  HHS must develop a plan
for use and distribution of stockpiled antivirals
during a pandemic.  This plan should consider
existing federal and state stockpiles, as well as
how to address current shortfalls.  HHS must
recognize that while some states, have already
expended resources to develop their own stock-
piles, others have not, either as a result of lim-
ited resources or operational constraints.  
See Appendix B for a list of state purchases
of antiviral medications as of October 2008.
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2.  VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION:   A vaccine is the most effective way to
protect the public from an infectious disease outbreak, but current vaccine development
and production capacity is severely lacking.
 U.S. vaccine development and production ca-
pabilities must be enhanced.  The National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza sets out two goals
related to vaccine stockpiling: To stockpile
enough H5N1 (bird flu) pre-pandemic vac-
cine to inoculate 20 million people at the
onset of a pandemic influenza, and to be able
to vaccinate the entire U.S. population of
some 300 million within six months from the
onset of a pandemic influenza.  In light of the
H1N1 (swine flu) outbreak, the federal gov-
ernment is embarking on a similar course of
action with respect to the first goal.  HHS has
issued contracts to manufacture and test pre-
pandemic vaccines against the newly-emerg-
ing 2009-H1N1 virus for the Strategic
National Stockpile. The goal is to build a
stockpile of at least 40 million doses of 2009-
H1N1 vaccine to inoculate 20 million people
(this assumes two doses of vaccine will be nec-
essary).  Laboratories are already working on
generating the seed viruses needed for vac-
cine production. Once the manufacturers
have completed their seasonal influenza vac-
cine production, they will start production of
the 2009-H1N1 vaccine.7
However, with respect to the goal of vaccinating
the entire U.S. population within six months of
an influenza pandemic, challenges remain due
to still-limited U.S. vaccine production capabil-
ities.  U.S. production capacity is “completely in-
adequate,” according to a report from the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).8 Former
HHS Secretary Leavitt urged his successor to
ensure completion of manufacturing facilities,
so that in the event of a worldwide pandemic,
U.S. citizens are not dependent on foreign gov-
ernments to provide a vaccine.9
HHS is supporting a multi-pronged approach
for boosting U.S. domestic production capacity
by subsidizing the construction of new manu-
facturing plants and the renovation of existing
ones; funding research and development of
cell-based manufacturing technology, while se-
curing an egg supply for egg-based production;
and advancing the research and development
of adjuvants, substances that can be added to a
vaccine to boost its ability to produce an im-
mune system response.   However, a September
2008 report by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) has raised serious concerns about the
ability of HHS to meet these goals.10  
Other factors that might impede the nation’s
ability to inoculate the entire population in-
clude cost and the public’s reaction to the vac-
cine. According to a CDC estimate, it may cost
up to $8 billion to procure 600 million doses
of the 2009 A-H1N1 vaccine for 300 million
people (two doses per person).  This figure
does not include needles, syringes, distribu-
tion, and the like.
Whether or not the public would be willing to
line up for three flu shots -- one to combat sea-
sonal flu and two to prevent the novel H1N1
flu virus -- remains to be seen. Seasonal in-
fluenza vaccine uptake, even among health
care workers, has yet to meet public health
goals. In the fall of 2008, more than half of
Americans in a national survey said that they
did not intend to be vaccinated against flu that
season. Among the reasons cited were the
thought that the vaccine was unnecessary,
worry that the vaccine causes illness, and dis-
belief in the vaccine itself.11 
In addition to antivirals and vaccines, even be-
fore the H1N1 outbreak, the stockpile had ex-
isting shortfalls in the number of masks,
respirators, and medications needed to respond
to this and other possible pandemics, which
must be completed to be prepared for the pos-
sibility of other strains of flu.  As of 2008, HHS
had purchased 105.8 million N95 respirators;
51.7 million surgical masks; 20 million syringes
for pre-pandemic vaccine; and 4,000 ventila-
tors.3,4 It is important to continue to evaluate
medical supply needs for the stockpile and re-
plenish supplies as they are used.
During the H1N1 outbreak, HHS released a
total of 11 million treatment courses to help
states, in addition to moving 400,000 treatment
courses to Mexico to help stop the spread of the
virus.  In order to replenish the Strategic Na-
tional Stockpile, HHS announced at the end of
April 2009 that it would purchase an additional
13 million antiviral treatment courses.5 States
have purchased 23 million courses of antivirals,
as of January 2009 with the help of a federal sub-
sidy. (The goal is for states to purchase 31 mil-
lion courses).6
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3.  VACCINATING ALL AMERICANS -- the country has not developed or adequately tested a system
that will ensure that all Americans would be able to be inoculated in a short period of time.
 A robust public system is needed to be able to
vaccinate all Americans for H1N1 over a short
period of time.  Currently, only a fraction of
Americans are vaccinated each year for the
seasonal flu and they typically receive shots
through their doctors or private clinics.  If the
country is going to be successful in creating a
program that can vaccinate all Americans for
H1N1 rapidly in the fall of 2009, a publicly-di-
rected program will be necessary to oversee
vaccinations and coordinate delivery through
a combination of public and private settings.
This will require an infusion of major re-
sources to state and local health departments
responsible for creating this system.  Estimates
by state and local health officials suggest that
between $15 and $20 per person may be
needed for administration and follow up.  
 Adequate and sustained funding is needed for
biomedical research and development to keep
pace with new technologies.  
The federal government should enhance re-
search and development of vaccines and pub-
lic health technologies.  Basic technology and
tools of public health must be modernized to
adequately protect the American people. This
includes research and development of vac-
cines and new technologies; and improved
chemical laboratory testing capabilities.
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BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY (BARDA)
The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) was established to encour-
age and facilitate research and development (R&D) of new biomedical countermeasures, diagnostics,
and related technologies; however, the intentions of the Congress and the administration in creating
BARDA are far from being realized. The small amount of funding provided to BARDA to date only has
allowed HHS to establish an infrastructure to support a yet-to-be-seen robust advanced R&D portfo-
lio for many innovative biomedical products.  To achieve the goals identified in HHS’ Public Health
Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Implementation Plan, BARDA would need $3.39 bil-
lion in FY 2009 to have a 90 percent chance of developing successful medical countermeasures for
each biodefense requirement set forth in the plan.   
Congress should increase the level of BARDA funding to at least $850 million as advised by 14 sena-
tors who signed a letter to the Appropriations Committee on this issue on May 7, 2009 and as re-
quested in last year’s Presidential FY 2009 Amended Budget request.12  
FLU VACCINE CAPACITY WORLDWIDE IS LIMITED
Worldwide, the five egg-based flu vaccine manufacturers include the following: 
 CSL Limited (Australia) which makes Afluria; 
 GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals (Belgium) which makes Fluarix;  
 ID Biomedical (Canada), which makes FluLaval; 
 Novartis Vaccine (UK), which makes Fluvirin; and 
 Sanofi Pasteur (Pennsylvania, USA), which makes Fluzone. 
In addition, MedImmune makes FluMist, which is a live attenuated nasal spray vaccine.  
On May 6, 2009, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved a new egg-based influenza
vaccine facility in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, which will produce 100 million doses of Fluzone when
operating at full capacity. This brings the total domestic production from Sanofi Pasteur's two-approved
facilities to 150 million doses. GSK is building a manufacturing facility in the United States, but it is not yet
operational or approved by the FDA.  The lack of U.S. manufacturing capacity means the country will be
dependent on imported vaccines, which will become more difficult to obtain in the event of a pandemic.  
8THE CASE FOR A PUBLIC SECTOR APPROACH TO DISTRIBUTION OF A
PANDEMIC VACCINE
The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan states that after a pandemic vaccine becomes available, state and
local health departments will be expected to:
Work with health care partners and other stakeholders to distribute, deliver, and administer pan-
demic vaccines to priority groups; 
Monitor vaccine supplies, distribution, and use; 
Monitor and investigate adverse events; 
 Phase-in vaccination of the rest of the population after priority groups have been vaccinated; 
 Provide updated information to the public via the news media; and 
Work with federal partners to evaluate vaccine-related response activities when the pandemic is over.13
While actual delivery of vaccines may occur in both public and private settings, it is vital for the public
sector to be in charge of the overall system of delivery to assure that key public health challenges
unique to a pandemic vaccine are addressed.  These challenges include:
 A pandemic vaccine must be delivered to individuals as rapidly as possible.  Americans re-
ceive their seasonal influenza vaccine over a period of many months and only a fraction of the U.S.
population receives a flu vaccine annually.  Health departments will need to organize (often in con-
cert with the private sector) mass immunization clinics that can speed delivery -- possibly as many
as 100-150 million doses in a month’s time.
 A pandemic vaccine will be rationed at the beginning of the production cycle, targeted at
critical infrastructure workers and high-risk individuals.  Unlike seasonal influenza vaccines, which
are manufactured over a long period of time but essentially distributed at one time, a pandemic
vaccine will be distributed as it comes off the production line.  This will require targeting of initial
doses to those key personnel (such as health care workers) who will be central to a pandemic re-
sponse, followed by those at highest risk for influenza complications.  This kind of rationing re-
quires careful oversight.  During the 2007 seasonal flu vaccine shortage it became clear that the
private distribution and delivery system was not able to systematically follow recommendations for
priority populations, and health departments were forced to intervene.  
 A pandemic vaccine may require two doses.  Assuring that all individuals who receive a first
dose return for a second dose will require a centrally organized system of monitoring and re-
minders.  It may well be that private sector entities (e.g., pharmacies) have systems in place to ad-
minister such call-backs, but they must all be organized and structured in a similar manner, which
can only be coordinated by a public health agency to ensure consistency with federal guidelines.
 A pandemic vaccine will require careful monitoring and reporting of adverse reactions.
Because the pandemic vaccine will be one with which there is far less experience than a seasonal
vaccine, it will be critical to assure that all adverse events are investigated.  This is a public health
responsibility and the system of vaccine distribution and delivery must be designed to assure rapid
communication of this information to health departments and then to the FDA.
 A pandemic vaccine must be distributed equitably, and should not be available based on
ability to pay.  With nearly 50 million Americans uninsured, and with broad-scale vaccination critical
to protecting not just individuals but the entire population from a pandemic, it is essential that the vac-
cine delivery and distribution system not depend on private insurance and reimbursement systems.  It
would be tragic if vaccines were more likely to be available based on insurance status or ability to pay.
 A pandemic vaccine distribution program will require communication and outreach to
the public.  This is traditionally a public health function; public health agencies have unique levels
of trust with the public, especially vulnerable populations.  That trust will be needed to ensure
compliance with a complicated system of vaccine distribution.
B.  ADAPTABLE, SCIENCE-DRIVEN PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS
During the H1N1 outbreak, it was clear that top
government officials were following the guid-
ance of public health experts and science was
driving policies.  Government officials provided
clear and consistence guidance to individuals
about the best ways to protect themselves.  In ad-
dition, the response continued to appropriately
adapt to changing circumstances as more infor-
mation became known about the virus and how
it was evolving, such as the timely decisions
about when to close schools or limit gatherings.
The outbreak underscored the need for ongoing
planning and coordination among all levels of gov-
ernment and between the government and private
sector.  It also reinforced  the difficulties of inter-
national coordination and planning.  Without clear
lines of communication and careful planning, it is
difficult to maintain an effective response strategy.  
H1N1 also showed the challenges that commu-
nities face around decisions to close schools or
work places or limit public gatherings.  There
are numerous ramifications for all of these ac-
tions that affect families and the economy.  It is
essential to consider the impact of these types of
community mitigation strategies, and plan for
ways to make them easier to implement, for in-
stance, by ensuring sick leave benefits to work-
ers, so they do not face the tough decision of
foregoing a paycheck against staying home to
care for their children during an outbreak.
The following are recommendations for ensuring
that planning and coordination are ongoing ac-
tivities and that community mitigation strategies
are updated and realistic:
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 Federal, state, local and private sector pan-
demic influenza plans should be systematically
reviewed in light of the experience with the
outbreak and response to H1N1.  It is critical to
ensure that the plans build in flexibility in re-
sponse, given that the H1N1 virus did not be-
have as many planners had anticipated -- it did
not originate overseas and our global surveil-
lance system did not give us the level of warn-
ing desired.  It is also important to review
various guidances, in particular the school clo-
sure guidance, in light of the real world expe-
rience over the last two months.
 The federal government should take the lead in
increasing and better coordinating federal, state,
local, and private planning and preparedness,
and all jurisdictions should work together to cre-
ate policies that follow best infection-control
practices. Often there is a flurry of planning ac-
tivities when a potential health threat is identi-
fied and communication about preparation and
response is strong.  However, over time, while
the threat remains dormant, private-public com-
munication may decline. There should be on-
going and evergreen communication among
public and private partners as to roles and re-
sponsibilities during a major health crisis, not
just when one becomes imminent. Further-
more, bringing together the creative ideas and
collective expertise of diverse leaders and or-
ganizations will help build community resilience
to a public health emergency.  It is also impor-
tant for local communities and health depart-
ments to coordinate based on the circumstances
they face during an outbreak and issues that are
specific to their communities. 
Government at all levels should work to engage
the private health care system and communities
in their plans and exercises.  Sufficient resources
must be devoted to preparing for possible dis-
ease threats and the government should be
transparent about its actions and held account-
able for protecting the public. Initial planning
by HHS and other federal agencies failed to ad-
equately involve states and localities in national
preparations for a pandemic, even though the
national plan relies on these efforts.14,15 HHS
and the White House should engage partners
in updating the National Strategy and Imple-
mentation Plan.  The federal government, in
collaboration with the states, should share states’
pandemic preparedness plans and performance
grades with the public to increase transparency
and build community resiliency.16
4.  PLANNING AND COORDINATION:  Federal, state, local, and private planning and
coordination must be consistent and ongoing -- reflecting the constantly changing 
nature of the influenza threat.
Clear, consistent, culturally-competent commu-
nication with the public is essential during a dis-
ease outbreak, so that health departments and
providers can let people know about latest de-
velopments, how to best protect themselves,
when they should limit their public activities and
avoid going to work or school, and when and
where they should go for medications or vacci-
nations.18 This includes letting people know the
prioritization plans for vaccinations when limited
amounts of vaccine may be available or when it is
more important to vaccinate a target population
in advance of the rest of a community.
 Continued work is needed in communities
around the country to develop and test effec-
tive policies for slowing the spread of infec-
tion that also minimize the known social and
economic consequences associated with these
measures. Such measures need to be based on
sensible and practical policies that are in line
with the science available at any given time of
an outbreak rather than responding to panic
or complacency.  Current state and federal
roles in invoking quarantine and isolation
policies should be clarified.  The federal gov-
ernment, in coordination with the states,
must establish clear legal authority and guid-
ance for the use of such measures to effec-
tively limit the spread of disease.19
One of the most difficult challenges during an
outbreak is managing sick leave concerns, since
currently 48 percent of private sector workers
have no paid sick days. That means during an
infectious disease outbreak, like a pandemic,
they may be forced to choose between a pay-
check and their own health.  During the recent
H1N1 outbreak, anecdotal stories emerged of
workers threatened with termination if they
stayed home, despite being sick.  Forcing sick
people to go to work or school during a pan-
demic not only threatens their own well-being,
but the health of coworkers, customers, and
schoolmates and undermines efforts to limit
the spread of disease.  The “Healthy Families
Act” was introduced in Congress in response to
the H1N1 outbreak to facilitate the ability of
workers to stay home when they or their family
members are ill, but it has not been acted upon.
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The Cuyahoga County health department was formally alerted
about the H1N1 outbreak late on Friday, April 24, 2009.  The
next day, the county activated its Northeast Ohio Health Alert
Network to communicate with other local emergency pre-
paredness partners.  By Sunday, April 26th, the state of Ohio
had its first confirmed case of H1N1 in a suburb of Cleveland.
That same day the U.S. government declared a public health
emergency and Cuyahoga County readied guidance and infor-
mation to be disseminated to the public.
On Monday, April 27th, the local preparedness working group
met and the 24/7 City of Cleveland/Cuyahoga County com-
bined Emergency Operations Center was up and running to
begin issuing clear and unified messaging on the H1N1 out-
break and to track the progress of and response to the out-
break.  The county public information officers developed fact
sheets and updated the county website with links to the CDC.
The county health commissioner, Terry Allan, and Commis-
sioner of the Cleveland Department of Public Health, Matt
Carroll, began holding twice daily conference calls with part-
ners from hospitals, nursing homes, safety forces, schools and
universities, daycares, and businesses.  They also established a
regular email briefing for local elected officials.  
Although Cuyahoga County has only had two confirmed cases
of H1N1, some local schools began unilaterally closing be-
cause of fears about ill students or faculty.  The county health
department was able to correct the false information that was
circulating and work with schools so that they were following
CDC school closure guidance.  The public soon came to trust
these local public health officials, which had the important ef-
fect of reducing panic and anxiety in the community.
Cuyahoga County Health Commissioner Allan attributes the rapid
response and mobilization, the ability to continue normal daily op-
erations, and the establishment of a link to the media and public,
to the fact that “public health had formally integrated as an essen-
tial partner in our community emergency response system.”17
Mr. Allan warned Congress in a recent hearing, that cuts to
state and local preparedness dollars could seriously affect the
ability of local health departments to respond effectively to fu-
ture public health emergencies.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO: COMMUNICATION KEY TO EFFECTIVE H1N1 RESPONSE
5.  SCHOOL CLOSINGS, SICK LEAVE, AND COMMUNITY MITIGATION STRATEGIES:
Strategies to mitigate a major infectious disease outbreak include ensuring that all working
Americans have sick leave benefits available and that communities are prepared to limit
public gatherings and close schools as necessary.
6.  GLOBAL COORDINATION – Efforts must be made to increase coordination across borders
to build trust, improve surveillance technologies and treatment capabilities, and encourage
science-based policies and decision making internationally.  
 The United States should work closely with
the World Health Organization to revise the
pandemic phase system and to encourage
countries around the world to base policies
for detection and control on sound science.
 The United States should also take the lead on
improving global disease surveillance.   The
President’s 2009 pandemic flu emergency fund-
ing request includes $220 million for enhanced
global disease detection and Congress should
provide these funds.
7.  RESOURCES:  Adequate funding must be provided for on-the-ground response.  Right now,
state and local health departments do not currently have enough resources to respond to a
severe outbreak.  
Congress should assure a reliable funding stream
for all core public health activities as part of
health reform -- both to prevent and address the
on-going public health responsibilities of state
and local government and to ensure back up ca-
pacity is available to respond to a major public
health emergency. Sustained funding to ensure a
fully operational and fully staffed public health
system is critical to emergency response.  During
an emergency such as a flu pandemic, all public
health workers will be needed to mount a the re-
sponse.  Frequent budget cuts to non-prepared-
ness programs undercut the capacity of state and
local health departments to gear up in response
to the H1N1 outbreak.  
 The federal government should update as
needed, fully fund, and promptly carry out the
President’s National Strategy for Pandemic In-
fluenza Implementation Plan.20,21 The National
Strategy and Implementation Plan should be
evergreen documents, updated as the science
evolves and the White House assesses the effec-
tiveness of implementation on an ongoing basis. 
At present, public health departments around
the country are under-funded and over-ex-
tended to manage the demands of their ongo-
ing responsibilities.  In the current economic
climate, public health departments are facing
severe cutbacks around the country.  Accord-
ing to the Center on Budget and Policy Prior-
ities (CBPP), at least 46 states face shortfalls to
their 2009 and/or 2010 budgets.  CBPP esti-
mates that combined budget gaps for states in
the remainder of 2009, 2010, and 2011 could
total more than $350 billion.22 
 To adequately support public health prepared-
ness needs, Congress should:
Complete the funding to implement the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.  The President
originally requested $7.1 billion to carry out re-
search and development for vaccinations, phar-
maceuticals, and medical devices needed to
respond to a pandemic.  $870 million of this has
never been funded. This money is needed to
continue pandemic R&D.  This funding was orig-
inally included in the proposed 2009 stimulus
bill, but it was removed before the bill’s passage.
Subsequently, in April 2009 President Obama
submitted a request for $1.5 billion in emergency
funding for pandemic preparedness.  Congress
should approve this supplemental funding.
 Provide resources for state and local health de-
partments to adequately prepare for outbreaks.
State and local officials are the front line re-
sponders to outbreaks, yet they have not re-
ceived any new federal funding for pandemic
flu preparedness since 2006.  $350 million is
C.  CORE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS
The H1N1 outbreak highlighted many of the on-
going vulnerabilities in the nation’s public health
infrastructure.  The system has been under-re-
sourced for decades, and now with the economic
recession leading to budget cuts in many states,
most public health departments are laying off
workers.  The result is that health departments are
already stretched too thin to maintain their day-to-
day responsibilities.  When an event like the H1N1
outbreak or other major disaster occurs, the
health departments do not have the resources or
personnel in place to adequately protect the
health of their communities.
The following are recommendations for provid-
ing the resources and capabilities needed to
maintain public health preparedness and for
bolstering the public health workforce:
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needed annually to adequately maintain state
and local pandemic preparedness activities.
The President’s FY 2009 pandemic flu emer-
gency supplemental includes $350 million for
state and local pandemic preparedness, which
should be enacted.
Maintain investments in state and local pre-
paredness efforts through federal grant pro-
grams such as the Public Health Emergency
Preparedness cooperative agreements, which
have been cut 25 percent over the last five years. 
 The federal government should modernize and
provide sustained support of disease surveil-
lance systems, public health laboratories, com-
munications systems, and other core public
health capabilities needed for rapid detection
and response to public health threats.
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CURRENT STATUS OF STATE PREPAREDNESS
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published
in September 2008, found that the HHS-led review of state
pandemic influenza response plans found “many major gaps” in
state pandemic planning in 16 out of 22 priority areas.23 The
GAO concluded that “while the federal government has pro-
vided some support to states in their planning efforts, states
and localities have had little involvement in national planning for
an influenza pandemic….even though the National Pandemic
Implementation Plan relies on these stakeholders efforts.”24
A January 2009 “Assessment of States’ Operating Plans to
Combat Pandemic Influenza” report from HHS to the White
House Homeland Security Council found that many states
scored well in areas such as protecting citizens and administer-
ing mass vaccinations, but found major gaps in such areas sus-
taining state operations, developing community mitigation
plans, and maintaining key infrastructure.25
According to federal guidelines, state plans are required to demon-
strate the state’s ability to accomplish a range of expectations, but
states have not been adequately funded to meet these demands:26
 Ensure public health continuity of operations during each
phase of a pandemic;
 Ensure surveillance and laboratory capability during each
phase of a pandemic;
 Implement community mitigation interventions, e.g., school clos-
ings or cancelation of large public events;
 Acquire and distribute medical countermeasures, like Tamiflu®
or Relenza®;
 Ensure mass vaccination capability during each phase of a
pandemic; and
 Ensure communication capability during each phase of a
pandemic.  
SEATTLE & KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON:  RESPONSE TO SWINE FLU 
AMID BUDGET CUTS AND EVOLVING POLICIES
A month into the outbreak, Seattle & King County had more
than 160 cases of H1N1 and several schools were closed to
prevent the further spread of the novel flu virus.  The local re-
sponse to the H1N1 outbreak was undertaken amidst con-
cerns about steep cuts in local public health funding.  In fact,
the last day of the 2009 Washington state legislative session --
in which Seattle & King County’s public health funding was cut
by $14.4 million from $201.6 million to $187.2 million -- was
the same day as cases were first identified in the United States.
According to the Seattle Post Intelligencer, the King County op-
erating budget deficit for 2010 could be $50 million and the
2009 budget may have to be further revised downward.27
A major concern is that two programs which helped in the re-
cent response face an uncertain future without additional fund-
ing: the childcare health program, which allowed nurses to
work with schools to screen for possible cases, and the com-
municable disease program.  According to Dr. David Fleming,
Director of Public Health for Seattle & King County, at the
height of concern the public health nurses who were working
overtime conducting education and outreach to schools and
daycares, were slated, as a result of previous budget reduc-
tions, to receive their lay-off notices two weeks later.28
The budget cuts also are likely to severely strain local and state
laboratory testing capability.  According to Dr. Fleming, “Limita-
tions in testing capability in our local laboratory, at the state lab-
oratory, and at CDC led to a national picture of the outbreak as
reported in the national media that was a week to 10-days-old
from the front line reality.  We had widespread community ill-
ness before CDC posted a single confirmed case in Seattle.”
Dr. Fleming believes the key to Seattle & King County’s success to
date in containing the H1N1 outbreak is attributable to communi-
cation, and local health officials being careful to say what they
didn’t know, foreshadowing possible changes in policy, and being
clear at the outset that what they learned about both severity and
transmissibility would determine their response.  “In that context
the community work that had been done on pandemic prepared-
ness, while key, was a barrier,” Dr. Fleming says.  “Changing poli-
cies to match those indicated by a less severe strain was difficult
because that’s not what people had been trained to do.”
8.  WORKFORCE:  The public health workforce is seriously strained, and budget cuts are re-
sulting in additional layoffs.
 Federal, state, and local governments must
take action to recruit, train, and retain the
next generation of public health profession-
als in public health.  From first responders to
scientists who detect and contain diseases, the
nation’s public health workforce is vital to
protecting the nation’s health.  There is a
shortage of public health workers in the
United States, and as Baby Boomers retire,
there is not a new generation of workers
being trained to fill the void of expertly
trained public health workers.  The country
has an estimated 50,000 fewer public health
workers than it did 20 years ago, and one-
third of the public health workforce in states
is eligible to retire within five years, and 20
percent of the local public health workforce is
eligible to retire within two years.
 Despite tough economic times, it is important
to sustain the public health workforces to pro-
tect America’s health.  In the past year, public
health departments around the country are
being forced to layoff experts and professionals
needed to protect communities from threats
like pandemic flu.  A preliminary survey of
local health departments by the National As-
sociation of County and City Health Officials
(NACCHO) has found both budget cuts and
workforce reductions to health departments. A
survey of 2,422 local health departments na-
tionally in November-December 2008 found
that more than half of local health depart-
ments have either laid off employees or lost
them through attrition. Because of the current
budget limitations, health departments have
been unable to replace the lost workers, and
they anticipate more cuts in 2009 and 2010.29
These cutbacks have serious consequences for
responding to a health emergency.
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SACRAMENTO COUNTY:  H1N1 CRISIS RESPONSE IN THE FACE OF BUDGET
CUTS AND LAYOFFS
On Friday, April 24, 2009 Dr. Glennah Trochet, Sacramento County’s chief public health officer as-
sembled her staff to deliver some bad news: job cuts were a near certainty due to severe budget cri-
sis facing California and the weak national economy.  
That same day health officials were warned about a novel influenza virus that was killing otherwise
healthy young adults in Mexico.  When the first case was diagnosed in Sacramento County on April
26, a panicky public jammed telephone lines with questions and “worried well” descended on local
health care facilities, while lab technicians labored to diagnose and differentiate H1N1 flu cases from
seasonal flu.  
Dr. Trochet sounded the alarm and her local public health workforce jumped into action.  A squad of
50 Sacramento County health workers began putting in 12-hour shifts and logged more than 1,200
hours over the first five days of the outbreak.  
That kind of dedication in the face of looming budget cuts and layoffs is emblematic of the U.S. public
health workforce.  Across the country, the economic recession is leading to severe cuts in public
health budgets.  In 2008, local health departments across the country lost $300 million and 7,000
staffers to budget cuts and could lose an equal number of workers this year, according to NACCHO.
In Sacramento County, over the past two years the Division of Public Health has seen its budget
slashed in half -- dropping from $9.8 million to $5.1 million.  The department has been forced to let
go more than a quarter of its staff.  According to the Sacramento Bee, in 2008, 57.4 full-time positions
were shed; an additional 31 or more could be lost in 2009, bringing staffing below 228 full-time-equiv-
alent positions.  “I hope the public realizes how much work is going on to keep them safe and to keep
them well,” said Dr. Trochet.  “It’s only when we fail that the public notices that there is a public
health disaster.”30
D.  SURGE CAPACITY AND CARE RECOMMENDATIONS
While the H1N1 outbreak was relatively mild and
limited in duration in the United States in early
2009, hospitals and clinicians across the country re-
ported major surges in patients, including individ-
uals with the flu, flu-like symptoms, or the “worried
well.”  As health providers prepare for a potential
return of H1N1 in the fall and/or the potential of
other outbreaks, caring for a major surge of pa-
tients remains one of the most difficult challenges
for the public health and health care systems.   
The following are recommendations for ways to
better prepare for a massive influx of patients:
9.  SURGE CAPACITY: The ability for health providers to manage a massive influx of patients
during an emergency remains a major challenge for emergency public health preparedness.  
During a major emergency like a pandemic out-
break, the health care system will be significantly
stretched beyond normal capabilities.  In the best
of times, most emergency rooms already face bed
shortages and staffing issues.  During disasters,
health providers have to adapt their regular prac-
tices to treat a large number of patients very
quickly.  Many of the surge capacity problems
have been identified -- including having enough
stuff, staff, and space to treat patients -- but solu-
tions to these problems are often lacking.  
The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan projects that
a pandemic could result in 45 million additional
outpatient visits, with 865,000–9,900,000 indi-
viduals requiring hospitalization, depending on
the severity of the pandemic.  Such a major dis-
aster would cross state lines and quickly over-
whelm health care systems.  
 The federal government must take a lead in
providing guidelines to states on surge capacity
planning.  Currently, definitions of appropri-
ate “disaster standards of care” are lacking, ac-
cording to the New England Journal of Medicine.31
Although various federal agencies have pub-
lished surge guidance, there have been few in-
centives or unified directions to enable states
to implement surge planning.  During mass
emergencies, measures must be put in place to
care for a potential surge of patients, including
creating alternative care sites and recruiting
additional health care personnel. Surge plan-
ning includes planning for altered standards of
care and addressing legal and ethical concerns
before an emergency occurs.  Hospitals must
also consider how to provide continued care
for daily emergencies and chronic care when
they are also responding to a major outbreak.
 Stuff:  Today’s hospitals and health care facili-
ties operate using a “just-in-time supply chain,”
which means very limited supplies are stored
on-site and instead are replenished on an as
needed basis, so many health providers will run
out of supplies very quickly if they have to treat
a major surge of patients.  In addition, hospi-
tals are likely to run short of ventilators and de-
contamination units very quickly.
 Staff:  Workforce shortages plague hospitals and
health care facilities even in the best of times.
According to a June 2008 report from the Cen-
ter for Studying Health System Change, “the
day-to-day shortages of key health personnel --
such as nurses, physicians, pharmacists, labora-
tory technicians, and respiratory therapists -- ex-
acerbate the challenge of having sufficient
numbers of health workers in an emergency.”32
One way to increase workforce capacity is to pro-
vide incentives to medical providers, such as pri-
ority status for receiving medications or
vaccinations.  Another is to recruit health care
providers outside of the emergency systems to
serve as volunteers during disasters.  Liability
protection concerns for volunteers must be ad-
dressed as part of the planning process.  An
analysis in 2008 found that eight states have low
levels of protections for health care volunteers
during times of emergencies, meaning that
states have only Good Samaritan or similar laws
under which volunteers may be provided with
an affirmative defense, but not necessarily im-
munity from liability.  In addition, 26 states did
not have statutes that extended some level of li-
ability immunity to groups and/or organizations
providing charitable, emergency, or disaster re-
lief services.33
 Space:  Hospitals and other facilities will have
to address limited numbers of hospital beds
and space to care for sick individuals.  They
will have to manage issues like rapid dis-
charging of patients, canceling elective sur-
geries and procedures, reducing the use of
tests and ancillary services, converting single
rooms to accommodate more people, using
cots and portable beds, and finding unused
space to treat or triage patients.
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MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS: VOLUNTEER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
RESPOND TO H1N1 OUTBREAK
The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) is a national network of community-based volunteer units that support
local public health and provide for an adequate supply of volunteers in the case of a public health emer-
gency. During the H1N1 outbreak, MRC units across the nation were activated to assist in the response.
Arizona
 The Navajo County MRC volunteers dispatched four members to help the Navajo County Public Health
Department in the receiving, inventorying, and sorting of Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) pharmaceuti-
cals.  Six MRC volunteers from this unit later assisted in the distribution of SNS supplies to local hospitals.
Florida
 The Sarasota County MRC sent three MRC nurses to staff a H1N1 triage phone line. Over six days
they worked a total of 27 hours at two community health department sites.  These volunteers were
also trained in personal protective equipment (PPE) protocols to conduct physical assessments of
walk in patients who possibly were ill with H1N1 flu.
Louisiana
 Calcasieu Parish MRC helped the Regional Office of Public Health in Lake Charles, Louisiana, with calls
to hospitals, doctors’ offices and other health care facilities to check on their needs and current avail-
ability of supplies. They also delivered test kits to health care facilities.  Approximately 22 volunteers
also were involved in community mitigation efforts, teaching proper hand washing at local schools. 
New York
 New York City MRC physician volunteers assigned to the NYC Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene helped to staff the Provider Access Line call center to answer questions related to H1N1.
Utah 
Davis County MRC conducted a point-of-dispensing (POD) training course in anticipation of future mass
vaccinations.
Washington
Whatcom County MRC volunteers were involved in respirator fit testing for the local hospital.  They
ran four fit test stations over one weekend. Their goal was to perform fit testing on 1,000 people
over 20 days. They also staffed a telephone triage call line.  Whatcom County MRC also developed a
potential Alternate Care Facility for surge capacity in event of hospital overflow.  Whatcom County
MRC staffed a phone bank in conjunction with Peace Health St. Joseph’s Hospital.
Wisconsin
 Southeast Wisconsin MRC volunteers staffed call centers, and clinics where they performed diag-
nostic testing on patients.  
Source:  All information provided to TFAH by the Office of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps.
10.  CARING FOR THE UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED:  A “State of Emergency” health
benefit should be created to ensure that all Americans will be cared for during emergen-
cies.  Providing care is not only important for the individual patient, but since individuals
are contagious, it also helps limit the spread of disease to others.  
With more than 15 percent of Americans lack-
ing health insurance coverage, the financial im-
pact on the country’s public health and health
care systems could be disastrous if hospitals,
community health centers, and primary care fa-
cilities treat large numbers of uninsured.34 Like-
wise, if uninsured or underinsured patients
hesitate to seek treatment because of fears of
out-of-pocket costs, treating and containing the
further spread of a pandemic would be nearly
impossible.  According to the Center for Biose-
curity, U.S. hospitals could lose as much as $3.9
billion in uncompensated care and cash flow
losses in a severe pandemic.35
Health reform offers the opportunity to find
ways to ensure all Americans would be covered
during an infectious disease outbreak and that
health providers would be compensated for pro-
viding care.  
 However, if universal health insurance cover-
age is not achieved, the federal government
should act now to create emergency health
coverage and reimbursement.  It would have
to guarantee providers some level of com-
pensation for the services they provide during
a pandemic, while encouraging individuals to
come forward for diagnosis or treatment.  
For the health care system, the emergency ben-
efit would mitigate the economic impact of pro-
viding such a high level of emergency care, much
of which may be uncompensated, while also for-
going revenue generating activities, such as elec-
tive surgeries, which could place hospitals and
other health care providers in financial jeopardy.
The benefit would also encourage the unin-
sured or underinsured who fall ill to access
primary care services for prompt diagnosis
and treatment and not be delayed due to con-
cerns about their inability to pay for services.
Delayed diagnosis may complicate public
health officials’ abilities to control the spread
of infection. Similarly, delayed diagnosis
might render useless potential treatment with
antivirals, since such treatment is most effec-
tive when begun early after infection.
 The Public Health Emergency Response Act
(PHERA) is an example of legislation that would
address this concern.  The act calls for bolster-
ing public health preparedness as part of a re-
formed health system.  It would address
payment streams for hospitals and health care
providers during emergencies, and it supports
major equipment upgrades and maintenance of
capacity for hospitals and health care facilities.36
Currently, hospital preparedness is financed
through the Hospital Preparedness Program
(HPP), which focuses on improving the clini-
cal response to a large-scale health emergency.
Initially run by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), HPP is now
run by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) as man-
dated by the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act.  ASPR awards one-year
funding grants to hospitals and other health
care facilities to improve surge capacity and
enhance community and hospital prepared-
ness for all-hazards, including bioterrorism
and pandemic influenza.  The funding system
is viewed as unpredictable and insuffi-
cient.37,38,39 Hospitals only receive an average
of  $82,500 a year per hospital.  




LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH: 
KEEPING MESSAGES SIMPLE AND FOCUSED 
Even though the events are still unfolding, the significant steps that
the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (LACDPH)
enacted in their emergency response provide important lessons
learned and guidance for future actions and policies -- not just for
H1N1 or flu pandemics, but for most public health events.
Be quick to respond, but keep messages measured. 
Upon first confirmation of person-to-person spread in Mexico,
LACDPH’s emergency command operations were activated.
This occurred weeks before the first confirmed case in Los An-
geles and well before there were any notable changes in our
seasonal flu disease surveillance. Activating the emergency
command was not meant as a declaration of alarm, but recog-
nition that an effective response would require increased inter-
action among the multiple units within Public Health as well as
a close collaboration with many of our communities’ agencies
in the 88 cities in Los Angeles County. Public Health officials
were aware they would need to serve as the primary emer-
gency response entity. Bringing key internal and external
groups together from the very beginning of the response
helped them develop cohesive message, shared goals, and plan
coordinated action from the onset. In addition, because the in-
cident command structure is not a method of operations most
are familiar with, and is certainly not how Public Health rou-
tinely conducts business, this early activation allowed for clarifi-
cation of the flow of information and the process of assigning
tasks before tensions increased and in advance of any crisis.
Similarly, very early into their response, LACDPH enacted
several other steps -- steps that typically only occur after an
emergency has had local impact, but their early initiation
greatly improved our preparations and set the stage for our
ongoing operations. This included hosting an early joint press
conference with Public Health and several of our core com-
munity partners; this helped to solidify the collaboration and
further emphasized the roles, messages, and basic recommen-
dations. Very early into the response they also initiated the
process to declare a local emergency and to present key infor-
mation to our Board of Supervisors; this allowed for arranging
supportive fiscal and functional options in anticipation of the
challenges they would face in the response. The presentation
to the Board further clarified Public Health’s role in this type
of event and helped to amplify public educational messages.
Keep the message simple: focus on facts and promote
protective actions.
Because LACDPH held a pragmatic view of pandemic planning,
an area where they excelled was in their educational messages.
The core messages were of value before H1N1 events occurred,
applicable during, and still ring true today. For instance, they al-
ways stressed that it is wrong to assume that birds are the sole
source of a novel virus -- agencies that incorrectly used the term
“bird flu” as a synonym for “pandemic flu” in their educational
materials and planning documents were caught unprepared when
the swine-based H1N1 virus emerged. The importance of this
distinction was to emphasize that they cannot predict the cause
of the next public health crisis, and that instead, overall respira-
tory disease and emergency preparedness should be the core
focus. LACDPH also continued to hold a balanced view of the
role of antivirals during a pandemic not promoting a strategy that
antivirals can be used for community-wide prophylaxis. Instead of
assuming they could affect a pharmaceutical response to preven-
tion during a pandemic, they stressed a behavioral response
(washing hands, staying home when sick, etc.). A lesson learned
from the current H1N1 situation is that novelty and transmissibil-
ity does not necessarily equate to severity. The core pubic mes-
sage was to communicate the particular severity profile of this
pandemic in the United States (like seasonal flu), and frame the
prevention messages in reference to seasonal flu. Flu is always a
serious disease and every season is the opportunity and the rea-
son to prepare. And now that H1N1 has morphed into seasonal
circulation, this emphasis is especially relevant.
While the message focus was generally successful, an area where
officials felt they could be better prepared for was the great de-
mand for tailored information and guidance to many different
groups and populations.  They rapidly developed many guidances,
complied information and documents in multiple languages and
pushed out information through their Web site and other channels.
However, it continues to be an ongoing challenge to effectively
reach and reframe the guidance for the great diversity of the popu-
lations that comprise the 10 million persons in Los Angeles County.
Every crisis is a potential opportunity. 
Pandemic and emergency planners cannot overlook the many
“silver linings” to these events. Officials feel they have been fortu-
nate that, at least to date, the overall severity of this disease has
been relatively mild; and yet it has heightened awareness in the
general public of the need to prepare for a pandemic and also
forced some quick resolution to some policy issues that needed
attention, but were resolved until the emergency arose. For in-
stance, school settings have always been recognized as an envi-
ronment for the potential spread of disease; but closing schools
has to be considered very carefully as an approach to prevent dis-
ease transmission, and this practice can have serious unintended
impact on the function of our communities. As a result of the as-
sessments during the local response they developed a decision
framework for school closing and did not close any schools.
LACDPH has been developing innovative modeling projects de-
signed to provide a range of hypothetical scenarios and alterna-
tive solutions during a pandemic. The H1N1 events provided a
valuable opportunity to test their model and to enact and refine
an actual response to what was previous a hypothetical solution. 
The events also allowed officials to put their pandemic flu plan into
action: to identify its strengths and begin to consider improvements
where it is lacking. The events significantly strengthened existing
partnerships and provided a valuable opportunity to develop new
partnerships that had been overlooked. Planning is essential to ef-
fective emergency response and officials learned that the many
hours spent on pandemic flu exercises and community collabora-
tions could be successfully transferred into a real-life application. 
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PANDEMIC FLU PLANNING BACKGROUNDAA P P E N D I X HOW IS PANDEMIC FLU DIFFERENT THAN SEASONAL FLU?
Most Americans are familiar with seasonal flu, a respiratory illness that strikes annually.  
Seasonal flu kills approximately 36,000 people in the United States every year and hospitalizes more
than 200,000, but experts generally consider it a predictable public health problem, since many peo-
ple have some form of immunity to it and a yearly vaccine is available.40
A pandemic (from Greek, meaning “of all the people”) influenza is a new strain of the flu that is capable
of sustained transmission among humans and, as a result, causes a global outbreak.  Because there is
little natural immunity, pandemic influenza will affect significantly more people than seasonal flu and like
seasonal flu, is easily spread from person to person.  There have been at least 10 recorded flu pandemics
during the past 300 years.41
PANDEMIC FLU IS EVERYONE’S PROBLEM
If a severe pandemic occurs, it is likely to be a prolonged and widespread outbreak that could require
major changes in many sectors of society, such as schools, work, transportation, business, health care, and
government.  The public can greatly reduce their risk during a pandemic by being informed and prepared
before the emergency.  To be prepared for an outbreak, HHS encourages individuals, businesses, and
communities to:
 Talk with your local public health officials and health care providers, who can supply information
about the signs and symptoms of a specific disease outbreak and recommend prevention and con-
trol actions;
 Adopt business/school practices that encourage sick employees/students to stay home and antici-
pate how to function with a significant portion of the workforce/school population absent due to ill-
ness or caring for ill family members;
 Practice good health habits, including eating a balanced diet, exercising daily, and getting sufficient rest.
In addition, take common-sense steps to stop the spread of germs including frequent hand washing,
covering coughs and sneezes and staying away from others as much as possible when you are sick; and
 Stay informed about pandemic influenza and be prepared to respond.42
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STATE PURCHASES OF ANTIVIRAL MEDICATIONS
As of June 1, 2009, 37 states and D.C. had purchased 50 percent or more of their federally-subsi-
dized antivirals to stockpile for use during a pandemic influenza. BA P P E N D I X
Notes: *The percent reflects total state antiviral purchases and may include unsubsidized state purchases, which is why some states exceed
100% of their federally-subsidized allocation.  **The population count for California and Illinois does not include residents of Los Angeles
County or Chicago, respectively.  These two localities, along with D.C., received their own allocation of federally-subsidized antivirals based
on their populations.  ***New York State antiviral purchases include those made by New York City.   
Source: http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/states/antivirals.html 
37 states and D.C. have purchased have 13 states have purchased LESS than 
purchased 50 percent or more of their 50 percent of their share of 
federally-subsidized antivirals drugs to stockpile federally-subsidized antiviral drugs to 
for use during an influenza pandemic stockpile for use during an influenza pandemic 
State All Antivirals Percent of State All Antivirals Percent of 
Purchased by Allocation Purchased by Allocation 
Entity as of Purchased* Entity as of Purchased**
06/01/2009 06/01/2009
Alabama 533,553 112.8% Arizona 67,717 11.6%
Alaska 77,030 113.2% Colorado 215 0.0%
Arkansas 382,398 133.5% Connecticut 22,829 6.2%
California** 2,772,922 103.2% Florida 277,798 15.6%
Delaware 121,164 141.0% Idaho 8,567 6.0%
D.C. 90,926 155.3% Massachusetts 50,662 7.5%
Georgia 474,022 52.0% Montana 8,174 8.5%
Hawaii 172,487 131.6% Nebraska 71,952 39.4%
Illinois** 516,018 50.3% New Mexico 77,409 39.2%
Indiana 650,912 100.00% Oklahoma 93,765 25.5%
Iowa 312,631 101.2% Oregon 26,523 7.1%
Kansas 286,084 100.0% Rhode Island 11,900 10.5%









New Hampshire 68,000 50.3%
New Jersey 880,293 97.0%
New York*** 2,444,836 121.2%
North Carolina 677,882 76.7%
North Dakota 57,000 85.7%
Ohio 1,388,858 115.7%
Pennsylvania 1,298,792 100.0%
South Carolina 459,960 105.6%










FINANCING OPTIONS FOR CREATING SURGE CAPACITY
OPTION 1:  Establish a Preparedness Program under Medicare and Medicaid.
Even in a system with universal health insurance coverage, the costs of creatingsurge capacity in the medical care system will be above and beyond the usual
system of reimbursement to providers.  Therefore, an additional system to finance
the creation of surge capacity will be in needed and can be addressed during the
health reform debate.
A Preparedness Program through Medicare and
Medicaid could be created to help hospitals and
health providers upgrade equipment needed for
emergencies, and to provide a billing mecha-
nism for care during emergencies.
Medicare
There is precedence for using Medicare Part A
(hospital insurance) to compensate hospitals for
higher operating costs they incur in providing
services to low-income patients, and even using
Medicare Part A to preserve access to care for
Medicare and low-income populations.43 The Dis-
proportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments
are used to mitigate the financial distress that
some hospitals experience in serving large num-
bers of low-income, uninsured or underinsured
patients and Medicare and Medicaid recipients.  
Medicare Part A has also been used to compensate
teaching hospitals for the higher costs associated
with running graduate medical education pro-
grams and training medical residents.  The Direct
Graduate Medical Education (DGME) provides
payments to hospitals for the costs of approved
graduate medical education programs.44 Mean-
while, the Indirect Medical Education (IME) pro-
vides an additional payment to hospitals that have
residents enrolled in GME programs, to reflect the
higher cost of patient care costs of teaching hos-
pitals relative to non-teaching hospitals.
A newly formed Preparedness Program would
allow hospitals to meet and maintain enhanced
preparedness accreditation standards and
Medicare codes of participation. The program
would link payment to a process involving the
HHS Secretary defining the scope of allowable
preparedness costs.  Overall, this approach would
be similar to the Health IT (HIT) incentive model
included in the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009.  The HIT program is not a
traditional grant program where hospitals apply
for money to do certain things and compete for
dollars, etc.  It is, instead, like a lot of things
funded on the mandatory side, formula-based.
The HIT funding formula is based on hospitals’
Medicare share and Medicare bed days.  The for-
mula calculation produces a dollar amount that
an individual hospital is able to access if it can
prove that it meets certain thresholds for mean-
ingful electronic health record use.  The thresh-
olds would be defined by the HHS Secretary.   
In the proposed Medicare Preparedness Pro-
gram, preparedness accreditation standards and
Medicare’s hospital codes of participation would
be reviewed and updated by the HHS Secretary
to strengthen the preparedness requirements.
First year funding would be available to individual
hospitals on a formula-basis if they produced an
action plan for their preparedness planning, the
scope of which would be defined by the HHS Sec-
retary.  In subsequent years, formula-based fund-
ing would be available if individual hospitals met
preparedness structure and process benchmark
measures defined by the HHS Secretary.  The for-
mula would be based on hospitals’ Medicare
share and Medicare bed days.  The HHS Secre-
tary would be required to report to Congress an-
nually on the use of preparedness program
dollars, and in year five make recommendations
for improvements in the program including ad-
dressing any need for variations in the funding
formula based on geography, risk-assessment, etc.
Medicaid
In order to reach children’s hospitals not reim-
bursed by Medicare, hospital preparedness pay-
ments would need to include a parallel funding
stream in Medicaid.  
Medicaid is a jointly funded, federal-state health
insurance program for low-income children, the
aged, blind, and/or disabled, and other people
who are eligible to receive federally assisted in-
come maintenance payments.  Medicaid is a state
administered program and each state sets its own
guidelines regarding eligibility and services, how-
ever, the federal government sets a minimum el-
igibility floor ensuring a certain level of coverage
to select populations.
CA P P E N D I X
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OPTION 2:  Use Direct and Indirect Payments to Reimburse Hospitals for
Surge Costs.  
Eligibility for Reimbursement and Standards for Surge Capacity
The Graduate Medical Education (GME) pro-
gram currently uses both direct and indirect pay-
ments to reimburse teaching hospitals for the
cost of educating medical students.  Direct Grad-
uate Medical Education (DGME) provides pay-
ments to hospitals for the costs of approved
graduate medical education programs.  Mean-
while, Indirect Medical Education (IME) pro-
vides an additional payment to hospitals that have
residents enrolled in GME programs, to reflect
the higher cost of patient care costs of teaching
hospitals relative to non-teaching hospitals.45
The creation of a Direct Preparedness Payments
(DPP) and Indirect Preparedness Payments (IPP)
could help reimburse hospitals for the direct costs
of preparedness, such as the purchase of extra sup-
plies and beds, and provide hospitals with a mod-
est enhancement for the ongoing costs of building
surge capacity, including hiring and retaining per-
sonnel and recruiting a surge workforce.  
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) could set up a new Medicare billing code
or a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) add-on that
could be used to reimburse hospitals for capital ex-
penditures and staffing for hospital preparedness.
This approach would face some challenges to im-
plement because Medicare currently does not re-
imburse through DRG unrelated to direct patient
care and the process would require ongoing au-
diting of hospitals.  CMS could determine whether
having preparedness training curriculum in place
could be reimbursed and perhaps whether hospi-
tals could receive an additional payment to cover
the higher costs of training staff in emergency pre-
paredness and surge capacity techniques.  
In the past, Medicaid has been used to reimburse
providers of medical assistance, including hospi-
tals, for infrastructure upgrades.  For example, in
October 1972, Congress passed a law (P.L. 92-603)
that provided for a 90 percent federal (10 percent
state) financial participation for the design, devel-
opment, or installation of the Medicaid Manage-
ment Information System (MMIS), a mechanized
claims processing and information retrieval system
approved by HHS.  The law also provided a 75 per-
cent federal (25 percent state) financial participa-
tion for the operation of the MMIS.  
The proposed hospital preparedness program
would involve a 100 percent federal match so
there would be no reason for states to opt out of
the program.  The legislation could also include
creation of a Medicaid reimbursement for the
state health department’s role in administering
and coordinating the new program, as described
later in the Eligibility for Reimbursement and
Standards for Surge Capacity section.
CMS, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and
other appropriate partners, could develop stan-
dards and guidelines for determining both if a
hospital should be eligible for (and is capable
of) developing surge and what surge capacity
entails.  Although CMS would provide the reim-
bursement mechanism, ASPR, with input from
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Prepared-
ness and Emergency Response (COTPER),
should oversee the program and provide over-
sight and technical assistance to state and hos-
pitals to ensure efficacy.  A number of issues that
would need to be addressed include:
 Through the rulemaking process, a certification
process would need to be developed so state
health departments could determine if a hospi-
tal is eligible to participate in the program. The
state would take into account the regional need
for surge and the capacity of individual hospi-
tals to participate, based on a state-wide plan. 
 ASPR would need to develop guidance to
states for coordination of a state program, in-
cluding communication between hospitals,
triggering of surge protocols, deployment of
assets, and other issues.
 In order to receive reimbursement, hospitals
would need to meet preparedness standards
as determined by the federal rulemaking
process.  Examples include having a hospital
preparedness coordinator, a hospital-specific
plan that is approved by the state, an interop-
erable communications system, and a conti-
nuity of operations plan. 
By agreeing to participate, hospitals would have
to agree to participate in a state surge program,
to be coordinated by the state health department
with guidance and technical assistance from HHS.  
 Prior to creating the hospital preparedness billing
code, CMS would have to determine for what
items it would be willing to reimburse hospitals.  
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